Transition Under High Tension

Complete translation of the article published in Atlantico – Full text in French

12 February 2026

Strategist and expert in international relations and Iran, the Franco-Iranian Maneli Mirkhan is the founder of DORNA – the Strategic Office for the Renewal and Reconstruction of Iran; a non-partisan organization working on the strategic foundations of a democratic transition in Iran.

Emmanuel Razavi: What is your organization’s mission? What are its pillars and objectives for Iran?

Maneli Mirkhan: DORNA is an independent organization designed as an action-oriented strategic office whose objective is to anticipate, structure, and secure the conditions for a political transition in Iran. It is neither a political party nor an activist movement, and it does not seek to exercise power. DORNA does not claim representative legitimacy and does not replace Iranian actors. Its role is that of a strategic facilitator serving a pragmatic process of political change for Iran.

Its central objective is to facilitate regime change and democratic transition while ensuring a minimum level of stability throughout the transition process for all stakeholders: the Iranian people, regional countries, and Western partners. DORNA’s work is structured around two complementary missions designed both for urgent circumstances and for the long term:

In the short term, preparing the ground for change. DORNA acts as a facilitator of convergence among three ecosystems that are currently insufficiently coordinated:

– The ecosystem of internal resistance and opposition, composed of civil society actors;

– The ecosystem of international actors, whose expectations and red lines must be aligned with the realities of the transition;

– And finally, the ecosystem of opposition forces outside the country, which the regime has sought to keep fragmented and divided.

Through its mediation and structuring role, DORNA creates a neutral space for a pluralistic process that is essential for any credible political transition with minimal risk of chaos. In the long term, once the transition period begins, DORNA intends to remain a stabilizing actor by supporting civil society initiatives and transforming democratic aspirations into sustainable, autonomous, and institutionalized achievements.

You speak of a “common foundation” for Iran. What do you mean?

Iran is an extremely complex country, intertwined with multiple social, cultural, ethnic, and political realities. Moreover, any transition can benefit from international support only if credible guarantees of stability are provided. Such guarantees cannot emerge from a fragmented opposition—no matter how broad—if it is unable to sit around one table and gather all components of Iranian society, from ethnic groups to various political affiliations.

The common foundation that we have been building within DORNA for more than three years rests on three complementary pillars that were constructed and consolidated during this period before being made public. This preparatory maturation phase was necessary to guarantee their credibility, solidity, and security.

These three pillars are:

– An internal ecosystem composed of mid-level actors within Iranian society and representatives of ethnic communities, which constitutes the key to stabilizing any transition and the best guarantee against chaos and fragmentation.

– An international ecosystem whose objectives, timelines, and expectations must be aligned with real dynamics on the ground to avoid unrealistic or counterproductive scenarios.

– An opposition ecosystem that is currently fragmented and competitive and must be brought into convergence—not by erasing differences, but through pragmatic coordination around a transition project. None of these components can claim to host or be the center of gravity of the process. Each is legitimate only in representing its own base. Therefore, a neutral space is indispensable, and this is precisely why DORNA acts.

This foundation is deliberately minimal. Without this common platform, the only outcome after the regime’s fall would be a power struggle among competing actors—a scenario the West wants to avoid at all costs.

Are opposition forces abroad connected to those inside the country? How can unity be achieved?

Connections exist, but they are fragmented and asymmetrical.

Each component is linked to its own social fabric: ethnic forces to their populations, leftist and republican movements to unions and professional bodies, nationalists to their supporters, and so on. The problem is therefore not the absence of links, but the absence of an architecture that enables coordination and the animation of the process.

Forces inside the country are today more united than is often believed, but they lack space for expression. Conversely, the opposition abroad has that space but must rally around a project that does not belong to any specific camp. Within such a broad coalition, today’s fragmented links with the interior can be consolidated. The viability of the change project will stem precisely from this structured complementarity.

If the regime collapses, how can chaos be prevented?

The state, in the classical sense, is not the regime. The state is the continuity of the administrative apparatus, ministries, public services, the army, and the educational and economic system. The Iranian state has survived the Qajars, the Pahlavis, and 1979. What changed were the political rules of the game and the ideology, not the entire apparatus.

The key to avoiding chaos is therefore to rely on this body of the state, located at the heart of the socio-economic pyramid, to ensure continuity. This ecosystem clearly perceives the regime’s failure and is ready to engage in a credible transition project—provided such a project exists.

DORNA works precisely on these administrative continuity projects structured around six analytical axes: political renewal, security stability, transitional justice, economic recovery, sustainable development, and social cohesion.

Another factor of stability is the full integration of ethnic communities into the transition process—not as secondary variables, but as key stabilizing actors. Their direct involvement is essential to building a credible project for a free and democratic Iran.

Western actors are not reassured by declarations of intent; they require a credible transitional governance, mechanisms to protect pluralism, real coordination capacity, and demonstrated political maturity.

Many opposition leaders agree on key principles, such as a secular democratic transitional government that protects minorities. If everyone agrees, what prevents unity?

Three major locks currently hinder convergence within the Iranian diaspora:

– Generalized mistrust, fueled by decades of infiltration, manipulation, and historical baggage. The regime has systematically exploited fractures within the opposition. Many accounts posing as opposition figures—whose sole objective was to discredit opposition leaders—have recently been exposed.

– Symbolic competition and personalization of leadership, which transform legitimate political differences into sterile and paralyzing rivalries.

– The absence of neutral and credible coalition engineering capable of organizing coordination without imposing political hierarchy. This is precisely where DORNA intervenes.

The contrast is striking: inside the country, unity exists. No protester has attacked another over different slogans. Despite diverse political preferences, all fight the same regime.

In the diaspora, however, these rivalries have become destructive and dangerous. It is time for opposition figures to face their responsibility: unite rather than divide. This dynamic must be driven by a clear and broad demand from civil society and supported by the international community to neutralize the regime’s manipulation strategies.

What are your networks within the public administration and companies?

We have a network of civil servants and mid-level executives carefully selected and not implicated in the regime’s crimes. For verification, we rely on databases concerning repression forces, command structures, and individuals with in-depth knowledge of the regime’s organizational structure.

For security reasons, I will not disclose names, positions, or channels. What I can say is that in most ministries and major companies, individuals are already contributing to the project. A larger reserve exists but will reveal itself only at the moment of transition.

DORNA relies on secure contributor networks to gather factual information, understand field constraints, and identify the essential skills necessary to reduce the cost of political transition.

Which personalities could unite Iranians?

What is expected today are figures capable of accepting being the product of a coalition, not its center. Credible leadership can only emerge from a pluralistic approach and a broad coalition. At this stage, the main external opposition structures have not fulfilled this role.

Reza Pahlavi has social capital. However, he has not entered into a dynamic of openness toward other political currents and cannot simultaneously represent a specific political base while guaranteeing the neutrality and regulatory mechanisms required for a pluralistic transition. This role conflict constitutes a major blockage.

The MEK is based on a non-democratic internal structure closed to society and lacks a social base.

Other opposition figures, although possessing legitimate and diverse social bases, suffer from organizational and structural weaknesses limiting their capacity to play a central transitional role.

This conclusion is not ideological but strategic: no credible transition can rely on personalized leadership, closed structures, or uncoordinated dynamics.

The true alternative will most likely emerge from inside the country. The role of the external opposition is not to substitute for that dynamic but to open political space, reduce tensions, neutralize risks of capture, and prepare the framework for change.

In Iran, what unites sustainably is not an individual figure but a shared political framework capable of subordinating individuals to national and inclusive interests. We need that solid and legitimate table today—with as many chairs as there are political and ethnic currents.

How do you explain Donald Trump’s apparent inaction?

What is described as waiting is in fact gradual pressure. Military, economic, and diplomatic pressure increases. Options are prepared, allies aligned, and uncertainty maintained.

The regime decides only how it will ultimately yield. After the January 2026 massacre, there is a before and after. Iranian society will no longer accept normalization.

No negotiation is possible. The regime will not concede on the nuclear issue—it is identity-defining—and the United States will have to intervene in one form or another. The question is not “if,” but “how.”

How can European states, including France, be convinced to support Iran’s democratic opposition?

Europe invests only in projects that are solid, rooted inside the country, and respectful of Iran’s pluralism.

The core demands are clear: regime change, the end of the Islamic Republic, and the launch of a democratization process. The fall of Ali Khamenei and the dismantling of the IRGC are preconditions widely demanded by society.

To convince Europe, one must demonstrate a credible, non-ideological, pluralistic alternative, real internal coordination capacity, and the ability to protect minorities.

Anticipating and managing the transition is also a way to prevent a major migration crisis. An unprepared collapse would generate a direct humanitarian and migratory shock toward Europe. A structured and stabilizing transition enhances security and predictability.

Europe does not bet on slogans; it commits to architectures.

The European Union has recently designated the IRGC as a terrorist entity. How can it be explained that in France individuals linked to the IRGC are allowed to organize public events?

France has full sovereignty to declare Iranian diplomats persona non grata.

The issue is now operational: a European task force similar to the one created for Russia must be established to coordinate and effectively enforce sanctions.

Dismantling the regime’s influence networks is long and technical work. In several countries, Iranian activist networks have proven effective, notably AAIRIA, whose structured campaign led to the dismissal of Seyed Hossein Mousavian.

These initiatives lack resources for international deployment. Supporting the Iranian diaspora in documenting, exposing, and neutralizing influence networks is a strategic issue for global security.

Influence attempts are proven. Many networks are identified or being identified. It is time to act—with firmness.

These actions cannot remain national. We observe organized sanction-circumvention patterns exploiting European coordination gaps. When one country acts, networks shift elsewhere. Strengthened European coordination is therefore indispensable.